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Federal Standards of Tax Practice: "Preparer" Penalties & Circular 230
Gwen T. Handelman
Washington and Lee University
School of Law
"Preparer" Penalties
I. Code section 6694 imposes penalties on "income tax return preparers" for
taxpayer understatements of tax liability attributable to advice that fails to
meet the statutory standards, explained below. Final Regulations under
section 6694 were issued December 31, 1991. T.D. 8382. The regulations
generally are effective for documents prepared and advice given after that
date. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(f).
A. 'Income Tax Return Preparer" generally is defined under section
7701 to include any person who "prepares" (or employs anyone else to
prepare), for "compensation," all or "a substantial portion" of an income
tax return or claim for refund of income tax. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36)(A).
1. "Compensation" includes any profit related to return preparation,
in cash or kind, and need not be received directly from the person
for whom the return is considered prepared. See e.g.. Goulding
v. United States 717 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. El. 1989) (holding
attorney paid by general partner to prepare partnership schedules
received compensation for preparation of returns of limited
partners).
2. "Prepare" includes rendering advice "directly relevant" to the
determination of the existence, amount or characterization of an
entry on a return or claim for refund. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
15(a)(2)(ii). See Federal Standards of Tax Practice--
Examples, Examples 1(a) & 2(a) (attached).
a. Section 6694 penalties apply not only to preparers who
sign a return or claim for refund, but also to nonsigning
preparers "who provide advice (written or oral) to a
taxpayer or to [another] preparer." Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
1(b)(2).
b. Advice on specific issues of law is considered preparation
only if provided with respect to events that have already
occurred and not with respect to the consequences of
contemplated actions. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(2)(i).
3. Whether the person considered as having prepared an entry is aftpreparer" depends upon whether the entry constitutes a
"substantial" portion of the return. E the preparer of a
partnership return is considered a preparer of a partner's return
if the entries on the partnership return that are reportable on the
partner's return constitute a substantial portion of the partner's
return. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(3). See e.g. Goulding v.
United States 957 F.2d 1420 (7th Cir. 1992), affe 717 F.Supp.
545 (N.D. IlM. 1989) (holding preparer of schedules for three tax
shelter partnerships liable for returns of approximately 260
limited partners).
a. "Substantial" determined considering the length,
complexity and amount of the entry compared to the
length, complexity and amount of the return or claim for
refund as a whole. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(1). See
e Adler & Drobnv, Ltd. v. United States 792 F. Supp.
579 (1992) (memorandum opinion & order) (holding that
deductions taken by limited partners as a result of
partnership schedules prepared by accountants, although
not de minimis, did not cause preparation of schedules to
constitute preparation of a "substantial portion" of
investors' returns in light of the complexities of the
returns).
b. Safe harbor definition of "substantial": amounts involved
are (1) less than $2,000 or (2) less than $100,000 and also
less than 20% of the taxpayer's gross income (or adjusted
gross income for an individual). Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
15(b)(2).
4. Regulation section 301.7701-15(d) excepts from the definition of
preparer:
a. a person who merely furnishes clerical assistance;
b. a person, such as in-house counsel, acting for the employer
(or officer or employee of the employer) by whom the
person is regularly and continuously employed;
c. a person acting as a fiduciary; and
d. a person who prepares a claim for refund in response to a
deficiency notice or extension of assessment period after
commencement of an audit.
5. Although more than one individual may qualify as a preparer
under section 7701, for purposes of section 6694, only one
individual per firm is considered a preparer with respect to the
same return or claim for refund. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b). See
Federal Standards of Tax Practice--Examples, Example 1(b)
(attached).
a. The individual subject to penalty is the signing preparer or
the person with overall supervisory responsibility for the
advice given if no preparer with the firm is a signing
preparer.
b. However, in addition to the individual preparer, the firm
as an entity also may be liable for penalty if principals
of the firm knew of the penalized conduct or failed to
establish or follow appropriate procedures to prevent
proscribed conduct. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(a)(2) & 1.6694-
3(a)(2).
B. Section 6694(a): $250 penalty for a client's understatement
attributable to a position for which there is "not a realistic possibility
of being sustained on its merits" imposed on any preparer who
"knew (or reasonably should have known)" of the position.
1. A position is considered to have a realistic possibility of success
if a reasonable and well-informed analysis by a person
knowledgeable in the tax law would lead such a person to
conclude that the position has approximately a one in three or
greater likelihood of being sustained on its merits, that is,
without regard to whether the issue is, in fact, likely to be raised
by the Service. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1).
a. Although stated in language similar to ABA Opinion 85-
352, the definition of the "realistic possibility" standard
under the regulations is at odds with interpretations of the
ABA standard and is essentially equivalent to "substantial
authority" as defined under the taxpayer accuracy-related
penalty regulations. See e.g., William Raby, Salting the
Voluntary Assessment System, 54 Tax Notes 187 (Jan. 13,
1992) (stating that the "differences" between the two
standards are "impossible to really articulate").
(1) The "nature of analysis" (weight accorded
authority and determination of relevance and
persuasiveness) prescribed for determining whether
substantial authority exists applies for purposes of
determining whether the realistic possibility
standard is satisfied. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1).
(2) In determining whether a position has a "realistic
possibility of success," preparers may consider only
the "authorities" allowed in determining whether
substantial authority exists (that is, excluding
conclusions reached in treatises, legal periodicals,
legal opinions or opinions rendered by other tax
professionals). Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(2). See
Federal Standards of Tax Practice--Examples,
Examples 3, 4 & 5 (attached).
(3) One-in-three appears to be a mandatory threshold
rather than a safe harbor as the ABA Tax Section's
Task Force Report on Opinion 85-352 may have
intended. See I. Bernard Wolfman, James P.
Holden, Kenneth L. Harris, Standards of Tax
Practice 5005.06 (New Developments 1992)
(hereinafter Standards of Tax Practice).
(4) However, the realistic possibility standard generally
must be satisfied as of the date of the return (rather
than as of the end of the tax year at issue as
generally is the case under the substantial authority
standard). Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(b)(5).
b. The regulations include examples of the application of the
realistic possibility standard, but none illustrates how the
one-in-three threshold is applied where there is case law
both supporting and contrary to a position. See
Standards of Tax Practice 5005.02.
3. Exceptions:
a. Realistic possibility not required to support a position if the
position is disclosed, provided that the position is not
frivolous.
(1) "Frivolous" is defined as "patently improper" and is
described as an objective standard (that is, neither
the preparer's knowledge or intentions are relevant
to a determination of whether the position is
frivolous). T.D. 8382 Preamble.
(2) Disclosure may be made on Form 8275 or in
conformance with an annual revenue procedure.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c). See e.g. Rev. Proc. 92-23,
1992-13 I.R.B. 21.
(3) Nonsigning preparers may not be able to ensure that
the client discloses on the return that a position
does not satisfy the realistic possibility standard, so
special disclosure rules apply.
(a) Advice rendered to a client: a nonsigning
preparer's disclosure obligation is satisfied by
advising the client (in writing, if the rest of
the advice with respect to the position is in
writing) that the position lacks "substantial
authority" and therefore may subject the
taxpayer to penalty under section 6662 unless
adequately disclosed. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
2(c)(3)(iii)(A). The regulations do not explain
the preparer's obligation if the amounts at
issue are too small to implicate the
substantial understatement penalty. See
Federal Standards of Tax Practice--
Examples, Example 8 (attached).
(b) Advice to another preparer: a nonsigning
preparer's disclosure obligation is satisfied by
advising the other preparer (in writing, if the
rest of the advice with respect to the position
is in writing) that disclosure under section
6694(a) is required. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
2(c)(3)(iii)(B).
b. Failure to meet the realistic possibility standard is excused
if an understatement is due to reasonable cause and the
preparer acted in good faith. Treas. Reg § 1.6694-4(d).
Factors to consider in determining if an understatement
was due to reasonable cause and the preparer acted in
good faith include:
(1) whether the error relates to a complex, uncommon
or highly technical provision. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
2(d)(2);
(2) whether there are numerous errors or a pattern of
errors, but even an isolated error is not excused if it
is "so obvious, flagrant or material that it should
have been discovered" on review. Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-2(d)(2);
(3) whether the errors are material, but "obvious" or
numerous errors not excused even if immaterial.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d)(3);
(4) whether the preparer has established and followed
a normal office practice that promotes accuracy and
consistency, but even if excellent office procedures
are in place, "flagrant" errors are not excused.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d)(4);
(5) whether the preparer relied on the advice of another
paid "preparer," as defined under the regulations (or
a person who would be a preparer if the advice had
constituted a substantial portion of the return). See
Federal Standards of Tax Practice--Examples,
Example 1(d) (attached).
(a) William Raby has argued that, although an
article is not "authority" under the
regulations, the opinion that there is a
realistic possibility of success on the merits
from the author of an article "should insulate
the signing preparer against a section 6694(a)
penalty." William Raby, Salting the
Voluntary Assessment System, 54 Tax Notes
187 (Jan. 13, 1992).
(b) However, "good faith" is absent if the advice
is unreasonable on its face or if the preparer
knew or should have known that the advice
was based on inadequate facts or outdated
legal authority. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d)(5).
C. Section 6694(b): $1,000 penalty (reduced by any amount paid under
section 6694(a)) for an understatement due to a preparer's:
1. Section 6694(b)(1): willful attempt to understate tax
liability. Under Treasury Regulation section 1.6694-3(b),
equated with disregard of facts "in an attempt wrongfully to
reduce the [client's] tax liability";
OR
2. Section 6694(b)(2): reckless or intentional disregard of
rules or regulations, i.e. disregard of law, including Code
provisions, temporary or final (but not proposed) Treasury
regulations, and revenue rulings and notices (other than notices
of proposed rulemaking) published in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(f). Revenue procedures may or
may not be treated as "rules or regulations" depending on the
facts and circumstances. T.D. 8382 Preamble.
a. A preparer who makes little or no effort to ascertain the
existence of a rule or regulation is "reckless" if such
conduct represents a substantial deviation from the
conduct of a reasonable preparer under the circumstances.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(c)(1).
b. Exceptions:
(1) The regulations provide a disclosure exception as
suggested in the legislative history. H.R. Rep. No.
247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1396-97 (1989) ("specified
disclosure tends to demonstrate that there was no
intentional disregard of rules and regulations"). IF:
(a) the reported position is not frivolous;
(b) the position is disclosed on Form 8275 or
8275-R, as appropriate, or in accordance with
special rules for nonsigning preparers;
(i) Disclosure on the return in
conformance with an annual revenue
procedure is not adequate for these
purposes.
(ii) Disclosure must adequately identify the
rule or regulation being challenged.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(e).
AND
(c) a position contrary to a regulation must
represent a good faith challenge to the
validity of the regulation. Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-3(c)(2). See Federal Standards of
Tax Practice--Examples, Example 6
(attached).
(2) Additionally, preparers, like taxpayers, will not be
penalized for an undisclosed position contrary to a
revenue ruling or notice if the position satisfies the
realistic possibility standard. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
3(c)(3). However, no examples in the regulations
illustrate how to apply the standard where there is
little or no case law supporting a position contrary
to a revenue ruling. See Federal Standards of
Tax Practice--Examples, Example 7 (attached).
D. Duty to make factual inquiry: Under both 6694(a) & (b), preparers
generally may rely in good faith without verification on information
provided by the client. However:
1. a preparer may not ignore the implications of information
furnished or actually known to the preparer;
2. a preparer must make reasonable inquiries if information seems
incomplete or incorrect; and
3. a preparer must make appropriate inquiries to determine the
existence of facts and circumstances, such as substantiating
documents, required by a Code section or regulation as a
condition to the claiming of a deduction. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
1(e)(1). See Federal Standards of Tax Practice--Examples,
Example 9 (attached).
E. Conflicts of Interest: Some lack of coordination remains between
taxpayer accuracy-related penalties and preparer penalties, posing
potential conflicts between an adviser's interest in avoiding penalties
and a taxpayer's interest in minimizing tax in cases where the taxpayer
is not subject to penalty for nondisclosure but disclosure is required for
the adviser to avoid penalty. Such cases might arise if the taxpayer
reporting standard were less demanding than the preparer standard.
1. The preparer standards generally are consistent with taxpayer
obligations with respect to positions in disregard of rules and
regulations: taxpayers and practitioners both are subject to
penalty for reporting an undisclosed position contrary to a
revenue ruling or notice unless the position satisfies the realistic
possibility standard; and both are subject to penalty for an
undisclosed position contrary to a regulation even if the position
satisfies the realistic possibility standard. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
3(c)(3).
a. The explanatory statement accompanying the taxpayer
accuracy penalty regulations observes that "[framing this
exception [to the penalty for disregard of a revenue ruling
or notice] in terms of a standard that exists in the preparer
penalty context helps coordinate the accuracy and preparer
penalty regimes". T.D. 8381 Preamble.
b. This exception is made effective for both taxpayers and
preparers for documents prepared and advice given after
December 31, 1989, two years earlier than the generally
applicable effective date of the preparer penalty
regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(f).
c. It is unclear, however, whether both a taxpayer and a
preparer are to determine the existence of rules or
regulations and a realistic possibility of success as of the
same or different dates (end of tax year or date of return).
2. The preparer standards also generally are consistent with
taxpayer obligations with respect to substantial understatements:
if a position does not satisfy the realistic possibility standard it
also likely lacks "substantial authority," since they are virtually
indistinguishable standards. Thus reporting the position without
disclosure would subject the taxpayer to penalty under section
6662 just as advising reporting the position without disclosure
would subject the preparer to penalty under section 6694. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(iii)(A).
a. However, "substantial authority" may be determined as of
a different date than "realistic possibility" is determined.
Substantial authority may be determined as of the last day
of the taxable year to which the return relates. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(C). The preamble to the preparer
regulations explains that, in determining whether a
position meets the realistic possibility standard, a preparer
is not permitted "to ignore developments in the law
occurring after the taxable year covered by the return and
before the preparer signs the return (or provides the
advice)." T.D. 8382 Preamble.
(1) This discrepancy appears to account for the potential
for a "rare" case, addressed by the proposed
regulations, where a position has substantial
authority but not a realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits.
(2) The final regulations delete the "rare case provision"
because "commentators criticized this provision as
unnecessary and confusing," so no guidance is
provided as to how this discrepancy is to be handled.
T.D. 8382 Preamble.
b. The standard of accuracy required of taxpayers to avoid the
substantial understatement penalty with respect to tax
shelter items is the even higher "more likely than not"
standard. A position that lacks a realistic possibility of
success thus would subject a taxpayer to penalty.
3. The greatest tension may exist between the taxpayer negligence
penalty and the preparer penalty imposed for a position lacking
a realistic possibility of success.
a. To avoid penalty for substantial understatement under
section 6662(a)(2), taxpayers may not be required to
disclose a position that lacks substantial authority if it
results in an understatement too small to be considered
"substantial," but a preparer has disclosure obligations if
the position lacks a realistic possibility of being sustained
on its merits.
b. Treasury claims lack of authority to address these concerns
because the standards are "established by statute and
cannot be changed by regulation." T.D. 8382 Preamble.
c. However, concerns about conflicts of interest may be
unfounded or exaggerated. See Federal Standards of
Tax Practice--Examples, Example 8 (attached).
(1) There is no conflict if the adviser is not a "preparer":
if an understatement is too small to be considered
"substantial" under section 6662, the adviser's
involvement with the return may not be sufficiently
"substantial" under section 7701 to qualify as a
preparer.
(2) Also, there is no conflict if the taxpayer must
disclose to avoid penalty for negligence under section
6662(a)(1).
F. Validity of Regrulations: In enacting the 1989 preparer penalty
legislation, Congress explained that the new statutory standard
"generally reflects the professional conduct standards applicable to
lawyers and to certified public accountants." H.R. Rep. No. 247, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1396 (1989). Treasury has employed terms similar to
those of the ABA and AICPA standards but defined the statutory
"realistic possibility" standard as essentially equivalent to "substantial
authority." Arguably, deviation from existing practitioner norms is
inconsistent with congressional intent to conform the penalty standard
to ABA and AICPA standards of professional conduct, and calls into
question the validity of the regulations. See Standards of Tax Practice
5005.03. However, the regulations probably constitute a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.
1. Congress contemplated elevation of the preexisting preparer
penalty standards. See H.R. Rep. No. 247, supra (expressing
belief that the new standard is stricter than law then in effect).
2. The legislative history of section 6694 indicates that the statutory
standard was intended "generally" to reflect, but not necessarily
duplicate, existing practitioner standards. H.R. Rep. No. 247,
supra. See Richard C. Stark, IMPACT Makes Fundamental
Changes in Civil Penalties. 72 J.Tax'n 132, 136 (1990) ("The
context of the term in Section 6694 ... suggests that Congress
may have intended for 'realistic possibility' to mean something
more" than "a reasonable litigating position" adopted as the
standard by practitioners).
3. There was not consensus among practitioners as to a single
meaning of "realistic possibility of success." See Stark, supra
(noting that "the meaning of the 'realistic possibility' language is
unclear"). The ABA and AICPA had somewhat different
formulations of a "realistic possibility of success" standard, and
there was not even agreement within the organizations as to their
substantive content and application. See e.g.. ABA Civil
Penalties Task Force Members Release Comments on Notice 90-
20, 90 Tax Notes Today 178-4 (August 28, 1990) (asserting that
the meaning of realistic possibility standard "is still debated in
the Tax Section," some arguing a one-in-three chance of success
appears to be "inappropriately high"). Thus, a rough
approximation of the practitioner standard was the most that
Congress or the Treasury could have hoped to achieve.
4. The objectivity achieved by prescribing that realistic possibility be
determined on the basis of "authority" improves the
administrability of the preparer regulations over the ABA and
AICPA standards and thus may supply a "reasonable" ground to
support the administrative interpretation.
II. Code Section 6701: Where applicable, in lieu of penalties under section 6694,
Code section 6701 imposes a $1,000 penalty ($10,000 if the client is a
corporation) for aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability:
A. For preparation or presentation of any portion of any document
(not necessarily prepared or presented in connection with assessing tax
liability):
1. that the preparer or presenter "knows" would produce, if used in
connection with any material matter arising under the internal
revenue laws, an understatement of another's tax liability: actual
knowledge required, but can be inferred from acts amounting to
willful blindness to the existence of facts. Mattingly v. United
States 924 F.2d 785, 791-92 (8th Cir. 1991). See Federal
Standards of Tax Practice--Examples, Example 10 (attached);
AND
2. that the preparer or presenter "knows or has reason to believe"
will be used in connection with a material matter under the tax
laws (actual knowledge that the document will be used for tax
purposes need not be established).
B. On "any person," not only a "preparer," who assists or advises, or
directs another to assist or advise, in the preparation or presentation of
such a document.
1. Specifically penalizes "knowing of, and not attempting to prevent,
participation by a subordinate" and "ordering (or otherwise
causing) a subordinate" to engage in the described conduct. I.R.C.
§ 6701(c)(1). Cf. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
5.1: Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer.
2. "Subordinate" defined broadly to include anyone over whom a
person has "direction, supervision or control."
C. The burden of proof as to whether any person is liable for penalty under
section 6701 is on the government. I.R.C. § 6703(a). Mattingly v.
United States 924 F.2d 785, 787-89 (8th Cir. 1991), held that the
government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. But see Warner v. United States 700 F.Supp. 532, 533 (S.D.
Fla 1988) (holding that government must prove elements of section 6701
by "clear and convincing" evidence because of the severity of potential
penalties).
Circular 230
I. Part 10 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, commonly referred to
as "Circular 230," prescribes rules governing eligibility to practice before the
Internal Revenue Service, the legal obligations of such practice, and
disciplinary proceedings for violations. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (authorizing heads
of executive departments to prescribe regulations for departmental
governance); 31 U.S.C. § 321 (granting general authority to Secretary of the
Treasury to administer revenue laws); 31 U.S.C. § 330 (specifically granting
Secretary of the Treasury authority to regulate practice before the Treasury
Department).
A. Section 10.1 of Circular 230 establishes the position of Director of
Practice who is authorized to act upon applications for enrollment to
practice before the Service, conduct disciplinary proceedings and perform
other necessary and appropriate duties.
B. Section 10.2(a) of Circular 230 defines practice before the Internal
Revenue Service to include all matters connected with presentation
to I.R.S. personnel concerning "a client's rights, privileges, or liabilities
under laws or regulations administered by the Internal Revenue
Service," including preparation and filing of necessary documents,
correspondence with and communications to the I.R.S., and
representation of a client at conferences, hearings and meetings.
Section 10.33, which addresses tax shelter opinions and offering
materials, implicitly includes in the definition of practice before the
Service written or oral tax shelter opinions used in marketing. See
Federal Standards of Tax Practice -- Examples, Examples 1(c) &
2(b) (attached).
II. In 1986, the I.R.S. issued proposed amendments to Circular 230 specifically
imposing a requirement of due diligence in "advising clients about positions
taken with respect to the tax treatment of all items and returns."
A. Proposed section 10.34 would define "due diligence" to prohibit advising
a position that would subject the client to the substantial
understatement penalty, e a position that was neither supported by
"substantial authority" nor disclosed.
B. The 1986 proposed regulations have neither been finalized nor
withdrawn, but revisions are expected that will establish a standard of
practice before the Service compatible with the preparer penalty
provisions that have been enacted in the interim.
III. Proposed revisions to Circular 230 were to have been issued in June of 1992
but were delayed due to competing legislative priorities. At the ABA Annual
Meeting in August, the I.R.S. Director of Practice stated that Circular 230
amendments were a "high priority" and expressed the hope that the proposed
regulations would be published in the "near future."
A. The proposed amendments are expected to focus on:
1. establishing standards for practitioners regarding tax advice and
positions taken on tax returns prepared by those subject to
Circular 230; and
2. specifying circumstances under which abuses of the standards
will result in enforcement.
B. The proposed amendments also are expected to address:
1. prohibition of contingent fee arrangements for return preparation
services;
2. clarification of the applicability of Circular 230 to those engaged
in "limited practice," such as in-house return preparers; and
3. authorization of summary suspension procedures with respect to
practitioners convicted of certain crimes or disciplined by state
authorities.
C. If proposed regulations are issued before the 1992 William and Mary
Tax Conference, they will be addressed at the "Ethical Issues in Tax
Practice" session.
IV. Current' Provisions of Circular 230
A. Authorization to practice before the I.R.S.
1. Section 10.3 authorizes practice before the Service by:
a. lawyers licensed to practice under state law;
b. certified public accountants;
' As of September 24, 1992.
c. enrolled agents admitted to practice under procedures
specified in Section 10.4; and
d. with respect to specified employee benefit plan provisions,
actuaries enrolled by the Joint Board for the Enrollment of
Actuaries.
2. Section 10.7 authorizes limited practice by certain other
individuals.
a. "Any person" may prepare a tax return and any return
preparer may "appear without enrollment as the taxpayer's
representative . . .before revenue agents and examining
officers of the Audit Division in the offices of District
Director (but not at the District Conference in a District
Director's office)."
b. Individuals generally may appear on their own behalf and
on behalf of closely-related persons and entities, such as
their employer (individual or corporate), a partnership of
which they are a member, a trust of which they are
trustee, etc.
3. Section 10.32 provides that nothing in Circular 230 "shall be
construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar to
practice law."
B. Practitioners may be suspended or disbarred from practice before the
I.R.S. for incompetence; willfully and knowingly misleading or
threatening a client or prospective client with the intent to defraud;
"disreputable conduct"; or willful violation of the rules prescribed in
Subpart B of Circular 230.
1. "Disreputable conduct," as defined under Circular 230 section
10.51, includes but is not limited to:
a. conviction of crimes involving dishonesty, breach of trust or
violation of federal tax law;
b. knowingly providing false or misleading information to the
I.R.S.;
c. willful failure to file a tax return or participation in any
attempt to evade federal tax; knowingly suggesting illegal
tax evasion schemes to clients or prospective clients; or
concealing one's own or others' assets to evade tax;
d. failure promptly to remit funds received from a client to be
applied to payment of taxes;
e. attempting to influence I.R.S. personnel through threats,
false accusations, coercion, or special inducement;
f. disbarment or suspension from practice as an attorney,
accountant or actuary;
g. knowingly assisting an ineligible, disbarred or suspended
practitioner to practice before the Service (violation
presumed if maintaining a law or accounting partnership
with a practitioner disbarred from practice before the
Service);
h. contemptuous conduct (including use of abusive language,
knowingly making false accusations or circulating or
publishing malicious or libelous matter) in connection with
practice before the Service;
i. knowingly, recklessly, or through gross incompetence
giving a false or misleading opinion, or a pattern of
providing incompetent opinions, on questions arising under
federal tax law.
(1) Reckless conduct is a highly unreasonable omission
or misrepresentation, involving not merely simple or
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure
from the standards of ordinary care, that is either
known or so obvious that the competent practitioner
must or should have been aware of it; and
(2) gross incompetence includes conduct that reflects
gross indifference, preparation which is grossly
inadequate under the circumstances, and a
consistent failure to perform obligations to the
client.
(3) False opinions include those arising from: knowing
misstatement of fact or law; assertion of a position
known to be unwarranted under existing law;
counseling conduct known to be illegal or fraudulent;
concealment of matters legally required to be
revealed; conscious disregard of information
indicating that material facts expressed in a tax
opinion or offering material are false or misleading.
2. Duties and restrictions on practitioners established under
subpart B:
a. duty to supply information to I.R.S. upon proper and lawful
request. Circular 230 § 10.20;
b. duty to advise client upon discovery of any error or
omission or other noncompliance with the tax laws.
Circular 230 § 10.21;
c. duty to exercise due diligence as to accuracy of submissions
and statements to I.R.S. Circular 230 § 10.22;
d. duty not to unreasonably delay disposition of I.R.S.
matters. Circular 230 § 10.23;
e. prohibition against employing or working for any person
disbarred or suspended from practice before the I.R.S.
Circular 230 § 10.24;
f. prohibition against representing clients in a matter on
which the practitioner's partner substantially participated
while in government employment; Circular 230 § 10.25;
g. prohibition of former government employees from working
on matters they participated in as government employees.
Circular 230 § 10.26;
h. prohibition against acting as notary in I.R.S. matters.
Circular 230 § 10.27;
i. prohibition of unconscionable fees. Circular 230 § 10.28;
j. prohibition against representing conflicting interests except
with consent of directly interested parties. Circular 230 §
10.29;
19
k. restrictions on permissible advertising and prohibition of
misleading advertising and coercive solicitation, conforming
to recent Supreme Court commercial speech decisions.
Circular 230 § 10.30;
1. prohibition against negotiating taxpayer refund checks.
Circular 230 § 10.31; and
m. duty to observe specified due diligence requirements with
respect to tax shelter opinions. Circular 230 § 10.33.
Federal Standards of Tax Practice
Examples
Attorney A provides advice to Client C concerning the proper treatment of an
item on C's income tax return. In preparation for providing that advice, A
discusses the matter with Attorney B, who is associated with the same firm as
A. B recommends that A advise C to take an undisclosed position. Although
A is the attorney with overall supervisory responsibility for providing the
advice, A in good faith follows B's recommendation. Neither attorney A nor
any other attorney associated with A's firm signs C's return as a preparer. It
is later determined that the position that A advised C to adopt without
disclosure does not satisfy the realistic possibility standard. Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-1(b)(3).
(a) Is Attorney A an income tax return preparer? Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-
15(a) & 1.6694-1(b)(1).
Attorney A is a nonsigning preparer if the entry(ies) with respect
to which A provided advice constituted a "substantial portion" of the
return.
(b) Is Attorney B an income tax return preparer? Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
1(b)(1).
Attorney B is not a preparer because only one adviser per firm is
a preparer and that is A because A had overall supervisory
responsibility.
(c) Does either attorney's conduct constitute "practice before the Internal
Revenue Service"? Circular 230 §§ 10.2(a) & 10.7.
Apparently both A and B are engaged in practice before the
Service by virtue of their involvement in the preparation of documents
to be submitted to the I.R.S. The definition of practice before the
Service is very broad and does not include a de minimis exception, but
normally no sanction would be imposed for a single breach of diligence.
(d) If Attorney A is considered a preparer, could A avoid penalty under the
reasonable cause and good faith exception on account of A's reliance on the
advice of B? Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d)(5).
No, because to be excused for reliance on another preparer, A
must rely on a "preparer" as defined under the regulations, and B is not
because A and B are with the same firm.
2. Attorney A provides advice to the accountant of corporate Client C in
connection with the preparation of the corporation's financial statements. The
accountant is attempting to determine if the reserve for taxes is reasonable
and asks for A's opinion on the tax consequences of a transaction which the
corporation has consummated. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(2)(ii).
(a) Is Attorney A an income tax return preparer? Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
15(a).
A is not a preparer because A did not provide advice "directly
relevant" to an entry on a return or claim for refund since the
accountant was not at the time acting as a preparer of the corporation's
tax returns.
(b) Does Attorney A's conduct constitute "practice before the Internal
Revenue Service"? Circular 230 §§ 10.2(a) & 10.7.
No, because the document with respect to which A provided
advice was not prepared for presentation to the I.R.S. nor for the
purposes of marketing a tax shelter.
3. A statute is silent as to whether a taxpayer may take a certain position on the
taxpayer's 1991 Federal income tax return. Three private letter rulings issued
to other taxpayers in 1987 and 1988 support the taxpayer's position. However,
proposed regulations issued in 1990 are clearly contrary to the taxpayer's
position.
Does the position satisfy the realistic possibility of success standard?
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(3), Ex. 5.
Only "authority" as defined under section 6662 may be considered.
After issuance of proposed regulations, inconsistent private rulings are
no longer authority because, according to the preamble to the final
preparer regulations, "proposed regulations are subject to a higher level
of review than private rulings and it is not appropriate to retain as an
authority a document that does not accurately reflect the current status
of the law and position of the Service." Therefore, the rulings are not
taken into account in determining whether the position satisfies the
realistic possibility standard.
The explanation of Regulation section 1.6694-2(b)(3), Example 5
states that the position may or may not satisfy the realistic possibility
standard, depending on an analysis of all the relevant authorities. It is
unclear whether this statement contemplates the existence of
authorities other than those specifically mentioned in the example or is
intended to imply that a position may be supported by a realistic
possibility of success without any supporting "authority" if the only
contrary authority is a proposed regulation. The latter conclusion seems
inconsistent with the requirement that only "authority" under section
6662 may be considered in determining the existence of a realistic
possibility. It would seem that if there is only one authority, and that
is contrary to the position, the position could not be supported by a
realistic possibility of success.
However, Regulation section 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (made applicable to
the determination of a realistic possibility of success on the merits by
Regulation section 1.6694-2(b)(1)) states that there may be substantial
authority for a position despite the absence of "certain types of
authority," and so "a taxpayer may have substantial authority for a
position that is supported only by a well-reasoned construction of the
applicable statutory provision." The regulations nowhere explain which
"certain types of authority" were meant, but this example suggests that
a well-reasoned construction of the statute may establish a realistic
possibility of success absent contrary authority more weighty than
proposed regulations (and private rulings, which carry even less weight).
It may be that a proposed regulation, which counts as "authority" but
not as a "rule or regulation," is of such little weight that a well-reasoned
construction of a statute is sufficient counterweight to establish a one-
in-three likelihood of success.
4. Your client manufactures widgets. A new Code provision provides that "No
deduction shall be allowed to any manufacturer" for certain expenses,
deduction of which was allowed under prior law. You believe that the new
statute is inequitable as applied to your client's situation. There are no
regulations and there is no other authority under the new statute except the
statutory language and committee reports.
(a) If the committee reports do not specifically address your client's
situation, does a policy argument favoring an exception to the statute for
widget manufacturers satisfy the realistic possibility standard? Treas. Reg. §§
1.6694-2(b)(3), Ex. 2; 1.6694-2(b)(5)(i) & (ii).
A position contrary to the statute does not satisfy the realistic
possibility standard. A well-reasoned construction of the statute does
not constitute a realistic possibility in the face of "unambiguous"
statutory language. Further, "realistic possibility" must be determined
as of the date the return was signed or the advice was given (depending
on whether the adviser is a signing or nonsigning preparer), so the
provisions of prior law are irrelevant.
(b) If the committee reports indicate that the statute was not intended to
apply to widget manufacturers, and there is thus a conflict between the
tunambiguous" general language of the statute (which adversely affects your
client's transaction) and a specific statement in the committee reports that
transactions such as your client's are not adversely affected, does a position
consistent with the committee reports satisfy the standards established by
section 6694? Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(3), Ex. 3.
The explanation of Regulation section 1.6694-2(b)(3), Example 3
states that the position has a realistic possibility of being sustained on
its merits, presumably because the committee report constitutes
tauthority" (as defined in the accuracy-related penalty regulations) on
which a court might rely in interpreting the statute not to apply to the
client. However, the position disregards "a rule or regulation" and so
must be disclosed.
5. In the course of researching whether an interpretation of a statutory phrase
has a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits, you discover that
identical language under another section of the Internal Revenue Code has
consistently been interpreted by the courts and the Service in a manner that
would be favorable to your client. No authority has interpreted the phrase
applicable to the client's situation.
Does an interpretation of the applicable statutory language consistent
with the authorities under the identical language satisfy the realistic
possibility of success standard? Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(3), Exs. 7 & 8.
The explanations of Regulation section 1.6694-2(b)(3), Examples
7 and 8 state that constructions given other provisions of the Code (or
other federal or state law) are not "authority" for purposes of
determining whether the interpretation of the applicable language (a
separate provision) has a realistic possibility of success. However, as in
the case of conclusions reached in treatises and legal periodicals, the
authorities underlying the judicial decisions and I.R.S. rulings may be
relevant to the taxpayer's situation. Further, the interpretations
themselves are relevant in arriving at a well-reasoned construction of
the language at issue, but the context in which the language arises also
must be taken into account in determining whether the realistic
possibility standard is satisfied.
6. Final regulations provide that certain expenses incurred in the purchase of a
business must be capitalized. One Tax Court case has expressly invalidated
that portion of the regulations.
May you advise your client to deduct expenses currently, in violation of
the regulation? Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(d), Ex. 4.
The explanation of Regulation section 1.6694-3(d), Example 4
states that a position contrary to the final regulations will subject the
preparer to the section 6694(b) penalty for intentional disregard of rules
and regulations if the position is not adequately disclosed even though
it "may" have a realistic possibility of being sustained on it merits. The
position may be reported if adequately disclosed, however, because on
these facts it represents a good faith challenge to the validity of the
regulations.
7. A revenue ruling holds that certain expenses incurred in the purchase of a
business must be capitalized. The Code is silent as to whether these expenses
must be capitalized or may be deducted currently.
(a) If several cases from different courts hold that these particular expenses
may be deducted currently, and there is no other authority, is reporting
without disclosure a position contrary to the ruling reckless or intentional
disregard of a rule or regulation? Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(d), Ex. 3.
No, because a position contrary to a revenue ruling may be
reported without disclosure if it has a realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits. The preamble explains that the example in the
final regulations refers to "several" rather than to "five" courts used in
the proposed regulations in response to comments that the proposed
regulations "created a negative inference that a position supported by
fewer than five courts would not satisfy the [realistic possibility]
standard" when "[n]o such inference was intended."
(b) If the revenue ruling is the only "authority" on the issue, is reporting
without disclosure a position contrary to the ruling reckless or intentional
disregard of a rule or regulation? Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(d), Exs. 3 & 4.
A revenue ruling may be disregarded if the reported position
meets the "realistic possibility" standard. However, a realistic
possibility of success probably cannot be established in the absence of
contrary authority. More likely, a revenue ruling is authority that is too
weighty for the realistic possibility standard to be satisfied if a contrary
position is supported simply by a well-reasoned construction of the
statute and no authority. The explanation in Regulation section 1.6694-
3(d), Example 3 (discussed in Example 7(a), above) that "several,"
although fewer than five, court decisions establish a realistic possibility
of success when weighed against a contrary revenue ruling may imply
that at least some authority must support a position contrary to a
revenue ruling to satisfy the realistic possibility of success standard. A
single contrary authority may be sufficient, however. Regulation section
1.6694-3(d), Example 4 (discussed in Example 6, above) states that a
position contrary to a regulation that was invalidated by only one Tax
Court case "may" have a realistic possibility of being sustained on its
merits.
8. A client wishes to take a position that a lawyer has determined has a
reasonable basis but is not supported by substantial authority. However, the
amount of tax involved is less than $5,000, so the substantial understatement
penalty is inapplicable. The lawyer has serious doubts that there is a realistic
possibility of success on the merits, taking into account only those authorities
permitted by the regulations, although arguments in the legal literature lead
the lawyer to conclude that there is a "realistic possibility of success" under
Opinion 85-352. See Lawrence Zelenek, Reforming Penalty Reform: Congress
Should Eliminate the Profusion of Accuracy Standards, 52 Tax Notes 471,474
(July 22, 1991); William Raby, Salting the Voluntary Assessment System 54
Tax Notes 187 (Jan. 13, 1992).
What should the lawyer advise the client? See Letter from Gwen T.
Handelman to Editor, 56 Tax Notes 113 (July 6, 1992).
A reasonable basis is not adequate support for an undisclosed
position under section 6694, so there may be a conflict between the
practitioner's interest in advising disclosure to avoid the preparer
penalty and the taxpayer's interest in not disclosing a position that is
not required to be disclosed to avoid the accuracy-related penalties. The
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-101(A), provides that
except with the client's consent "after full disclosure," a lawyer must not
"accept employment" if the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of
the client will be or reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's financial,
business, property, or personal interests." It appears, then, that the
lawyer must withdraw from representation unless the client consents to
the lawyer continuing the engagement notwithstanding the conflict.
It may be, however, that the circumstances of this example do not
present a conflict, either because the lawyer is not subject to penalty for
advising the position be taken without disclosure or because the client
is subject to penalty for reporting the position without disclosure.
Either may be the case. For example, it is possible that the lawyer is
not a "preparer" with respect to the return, particularly if the only
advice given is in connection with this one item, because the adviser
may not be considered the preparer of a "substantial portion."
Additionally, the preparer may be excused from penalty under the
"reasonable cause and good faith" exception if the adviser retains tax
counsel, perhaps the author of an article as to the merits of the position,
and relies on the advice of the other preparer that the position meets
the statutory realistic possibility standard.
On the other hand, although not liable for the substantial
understatement penalty under section 6662(b)(2), the taxpayer may be
liable for penalty under section 6662(b)(1) for reporting the position
without disclosure. First, the taxpayer may be subject to the penalty for
disregard of a rule or regulation if the position is contrary to a
regulation, revenue ruling or notice. A position contrary to a revenue
ruling or notice must be disclosed if the position fails to satisfy the
realistic possibility standard, and a position contrary to a regulation
must be disclosed even if supported by a realistic possibility of success.
Thus, the taxpayer and the adviser would be subject to the same
standard, and there would be no conflict.
As a practical matter, if there is no contrary rule or regulation,
it is quite unlikely that a position a lawyer concludes has a reasonable
basis would not have a realistic possibility of success. As discussed in
Example 3(a), above, if the authority contrary to a position is less
weighty than rules or regulations, a realistic possibility of success
probably may be established by a well-reasoned construction of the
statute resembling a position supported by a reasonable basis. The
preamble to the accuracy-related penalty regulations states that
"reasonable basis" is higher than the litigating (non-frivolous) standard.
T.D. 8381 Preamble. The substantial authority regulations describe the
reasonable basis standard as met by a "position that is arguable, but
fairly unlikely to prevail in court." Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2). While
this may represent litigation odds somewhat longer that the one-in-three
formulation of the realistic possibility standard, the distinction is
certainly difficult to articulate.
If there were such a position, not contrary to rules and
regulations, that a lawyer concluded was supported by a reasonable
basis but not by a realistic possibility of success, it is far from clear that
the taxpayer so advised would be relieved of liability for penalty either
under the negligence standard or the reasonable cause and good faith
exception of section 6664. The section 6662 regulations do not establish
that an adviser's opinion that a return position is supported by a
reasonable basis is sufficient to protect a client from the negligence
penalty. A position without a reasonable basis is regarded as
attributable to negligence. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1). However, the
regulations do not necessarily imply the converse (i.e. that a position
with a reasonable basis is not negligent).
The negligence penalty defined in the final regulations is imposed
upon conduct, not positions. Penalty provisions "historically have
muddled the distinctions between the standard of accuracy and the duty
of care." Judson Temple, The Tax Return and the Standard of Accuracy-
-Part 1 15 Rev. Tax'n of Individuals 315, 321 & n.24 (1991). Although
negligence represents "a failure to exercise a duty of care," in excusing
"reasonable basis" positions, "a standard of accuracy was superimposed"
on the former negligence standard. Id. The final regulations under
section 6662 return to a standard of care, defining taxpayer negligence
as the "failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the
provisions of the internal revenue laws." Similarly, taxpayers may be
excused for reasonable cause' and "the extent of the taxpayer's effort to
assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability" is the touchstone. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6664-4(b). "Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and
good faith include honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is
reasonable in light of the experience, knowledge and education of the
taxpayer." Id. The advice of counsel elevates the knowledge of the
taxpayer. Thus, "reasonable care" in these circumstances may
effectively elevate the taxpayer standard of accuracy to "realistic
possibility of success," which the final regulations describe less as a type
of position and more in terms of a prescribed course of careful conduct
in deciding tax issues (that is, identifying the appropriate sources and
"nature of analysis").
Elevation of the expectations of accuracy may be the tradeoff for
the greater familiarity with opportunities for tax savings that comes
with professional tax advice and the protection from liability for
penalties afforded by reasonable reliance on an adviser. Further, it is
not necessarily the case that "an unaided taxpayer may freely take a
position which a preparer would refuse to take because of the risk of
penalty" and that a taxpayer so advised would be penalized for taking
in view of the taxpayer's enhanced knowledge. Zelenek, supra at 474.
It has been suggested that the taxpayer's "duty of care may mandate,
in some cases, that professional advice be obtained." Then, the
reasonableness of the conduct of a taxpayer with issues demanding
professional expertise would be considered in light of the expert advice
that should have been solicited. See Judson Temple, The Tax Return
and the Standard of Accuracy--Part 11, 16 Rev. Tax'n of Individuals 64,
75 (1992). Whether or not such taxpayers actually obtain the benefit of
a practitioner's advice, they may be required to meet the professional
standard of competence--realistic possibility--with respect to undisclosed
positions or be liable for "failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply
with the internal revenue laws." Treas. Reg. 1.6662-3(b)(1).
Because exposure to penalty depends not only on the status of
authority, but also on the existence of reasonable cause and good faith
which reliance on a tax adviser can supply, it has been argued that the
adviser wields exculpatory power with "corrosive" effects on the
relationship between the taxpayer and the adviser. "The taxpayer can
now be expected to ask whether he or she can be viewed as having acted
on the basis of reasonable cause and good faith" and "to pressure the
practitioner for a favorable determination on this subjective issue," i&e.
"the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax
liability." The taxpayer will "seek the practitioner's opinion as a key
dispensational element needed to establish reasonable cause and good
faith." James Holden, Practitioners' Standard of Practice and the
Taxpayer's Reporting Position, 20 Cap. U.L. Rev. 327, 340-41 (1991).
But, even reliance on an adviser's opinion as to the substantive tax
issues does not necessarily demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) & (2). Certainly reliance on the adviser's
views as to the existence of reasonable cause and good faith will not
establish them.
Whether a client has acted with reasonable cause in good faith
depends on all the facts and circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-4(b)(1).
A lawyer may not ethically either misrepresent those facts for
presentation to third parties nor influence the facts and circumstances
by making affirmative misrepresentions to or withholding information
from the client. Virginia Disciplinary Rules provide that in representing
a client a lawyer must not knowingly make a "false statement of law or
fact." Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(5).
Finally, that it is difficult to tell a client something unpleasant
does not establish a conflict of interest, and the tension it may create is
not "corrosive" of an appropriate attorney-client relationship. Indeed,
the ABA Model Rules mandate that a lawyer acting in an advisory
capacity must "exercise independent professional judgment and render
candid advice." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (1983).
The Comment states:
A client is entitled to straight-forward advice expressing
the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often
involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client
may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a
lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may
put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits.
However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving
candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be
unpalatable to the client.
Although Virginia has no analog to Rule 2.1, failure to apprise a client
of unpleasant facts and alternatives may constitute an ethical breach
because the issue may reduce to one of competence as well as
truthfulness.
9. A client states that she paid $6,500 in medical bills and $5,000 in deductible
travel and entertainment expenses during the tax year. The lawyer, who has
no reason to believe that the expense information is incorrect or incomplete,
does not ask for underlying documentation or inquire about the existence of
expense records. The lawyer properly calculates deductions for medical and
travel and entertainment expenses based on the client's representations, but
in fact the client had paid smaller amounts, and an understatement of tax
liability results.
Is the lawyer subject to penalty under section 6694? See Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-1(e)(2) (example).
The example in Regulation section 1.6694-1(e)(2) states that the
preparer was not liable under section 6694 in circumstances where the
preparer did not ask for underlying documentation of the medical
expenses but did inquire about the existence of travel and
entertainment expense records. The implication is that the lawyer in
our example is not subject to penalty with respect to the medical
expenses but is liable for the understatement attributable to travel and
entertainment expense deductions. Because section 274 requires
substantiating documents as a condition to deduction of travel and
entertainment expenses, a lawyer is obligated to make appropriate
inquiries to determine the existence of substantiation.
10. Attorney A prepared for a computer software partnership a tax opinion letter
which was not intended for investor distribution. The letter was specifically
limited in scope to the tax aspects of the partnership and disclaimed any
attempt to deal with the individual tax consequences to partners. The letter
also stated that "the determination of fair market value is essentially a factual
issue and. we are not competent to express an opinion as to the ultimate
determination of the fair market value of the software masters." In spite of
the disclaimer, the letter was circulated to investors. The partnership
subsequently was found to be an abusive tax shelter due to the overvaluation
of the software.
Is Attorney A liable for penalty under Code section 6701? Gard v. U.S.,
69 AFTR2d (P-H) 891 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 1992); Raby, Section 6701 Aiding-and
Abetting Cases: What Does the Service Have to Prove?, 55 Tax Notes 367
(April 20, 1992).
Gard held that the attorney was not liable because he did not
"know" that the valuation of the software would result in an
understatement, and there was no evidence of "willful blindness": "The
only reasonable inference that can be drawn from plaintiffs conduct is
that plaintiff should have taken additional steps to investigate the value
of the software. That reasonable inference stands in vivid contrast to
an inference that plaintiff performed no investigation because he knew
that such investigation would reveal an overvaluation."
